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1. Introduction 
 
During the Summer of 2000, wholesale electricity prices in California were nearly 
500% higher than they were during the same months in 1998 or 1999.  This explosion of 
prices was unexpected (CEC, 2000) and has called into question whether electricity 
restructuring will bring the benefits of competition promised to consumers.  Federal and 
State government officials have initiated investigations and issued reports about the 
behavior and performance of Californias wholesale electricity market.2 Unlike previous 
price spikes observed in other US wholesale electricity markets, the California experience 
has not been a transient phenomenon of a few days duration, but a persistent series of 
events lasting from June 2000 through roughly mid-June 2001.3  This paper covers only 
the Summer months of 2000, with more intensive analysis of the month of June 2000, 
when most generating units should have recently returned from service from their Spring 
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1 This paper integrates and updates analyses contained in Joskow and Kahn (2001a and b).  
 
2 Reports include FERC Staff Report (2000), Kahn and Lynch (2000), California Independent System 
Operator Department of Market Analysis (2000), California Power Exchange Corporation Compliance Unit 
(2000) among others. 
 
3 FERC (1998) gives a detailed account of price spikes in Midwestern markets in 1998. Price spikes in the 
Eastern US during 1999 were related to reliability problems of various kinds (DOE, 2000).   
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maintenance outages and future developments in supply and demand conditions are 
unlikely to have been anticipated by suppliers.4   
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors that explain this increase in 
wholesale electricity prices.  There were a number of changes in supply and demand 
conditions in 2000 that would suggest that prices should have been expected to increase 
from the previous years: natural gas prices increased, demand increased, and power 
imports available to California decreased in 2000 compared to 1998 and 1999.  The first 
objective of this paper is to determine how much of the observed price increases can be 
explained by these three market fundamentals, assuming that the wholesale power 
market is perfectly competitive.  We do so by simulating competitive benchmark prices 
given these supply and demand factors prevailing over the Summer of 2000 and then 
compare the simulated competitive benchmark prices with the actual prices observed.  
We find that while these three supply and demand factors can explain a portion of the 
observed increase in prices, there is still a large gap between the observed prices and 
simulated competitive benchmark prices.   
 
The second objective of this paper is to determine whether and how much of this 
residual can be explained by the prices of tradeable permits for NOx emissions.  These 
emissions permits must be held by generating plants and other affected sources in the 
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) pursuant to the Regional 
Clean Air Initiatives Market (RECLAIM) program.5  The prices for these emissions 
permits increased dramatically during the Summer of 2000 compared to earlier periods.  
Including the emissions permit prices in the supply costs of those generators subject to 
RECLAIM increases competitive benchmark prices for electricity significantly, 
especially by the end of the Summer 2000.   However, even after taking account of NOx 
permit costs, during most of the Summer there remains a large gap between the simulated 
benchmark prices and actual market prices.  We tentatively attribute this gap to market 
power and related market imperfections associated with the structure of Californias 
wholesale electricity markets.   
 
The final objective of this paper is to examine whether our attribution of the 
observed gap between benchmark competitive prices and actual prices is consistent with 
available data on supplier behavior. Even in a perfectly competitive market, prices may 
rise above the relevant short-run marginal cost when demand must be rationed by prices 
                                                           
4 Prices in California remained remarkably high in October and November, then reached unprecedented 
levels during December 2000 and remained at those levels through the Winter and Spring months of 2001.  
The latter part of this period was also accompanied by an order of magnitude increase in gas prices, the 
evaporation of imports from the Northwest, a large fraction of Californias generating capacity was 
unavailable to supply due to planned or forced outages, some of which were mandated by environmental 
regulators, new regulatory interventions, and utility credit problems that may have made some suppliers 
reluctant to supply voluntarily.  It is clear that by late 2000, the normal functioning of the wholesale 
electricity markets had completely broken down.  Joskow (2001) discusses price movements and various 
government initiatives for this entire period. 
 
5 We have not examined air quality regulations that may restrict production through command-and-control 
regulations. It is our impression that such regulations are not binding in California. 
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above marginal cost to balance supply and demand in the face of capacity constraints.  
However, there are good reasons to believe that the attributes of electricity supply and 
demand--non-storability, very low (zero) short-run demand elasticity, capacity 
constraints, and (in California) a large fraction of demand being satisfied in the spot 
marketcreate opportunities for suppliers acting unilaterally to withhold output from the 
market profitably to drive up prices when demand is high.  Collusion is not necessary for 
firms to exercise market power under these conditions.  Therefore the diagnosis of market 
power should include both an analysis of price/marginal cost margins and a companion 
analysis of supplier behavior.  Accordingly, we examine whether potentially profitable 
generating capacity was withheld from the market during high-price hours.  
 
Public data on the production of most steam units are available on an hourly basis 
from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Southern California Edison supplied 
us with information from the WSCC on hourly generation for Long Beach.6 In addition, 
information of the real-time dispatch of GTs is available from the California Independent 
System Operator (CAISO).  We show that during high demand periods in California it is 
profitable for suppliers holding a portfolio of generating units with diverse marginal 
supply costs to withdraw capacity from the market even under otherwise competitive 
conditions.  Our examination of the data shows that a significant amount of generating 
capacity produced much less energy than could have been produced at marginal costs 
below observed market clearing prices.  This behavior cannot be explained by the 
CAISOs procurement of ancillary services.  Therefore, either the units were suffering 
from unusual operational problems or they were being withheld from the market to 
increase prices. 7  Interestingly, the one supplier for which we do not find any significant 
evidence of withholding had apparently contracted most of the output of its capacity 
forward and would not have benefited by driving up spot market prices by withholding 
output. 
 
                                                           
6 We discuss the comparability of these data sources below.  The WSCC data are available to all members 
of the WSCC for a nominal price.  The EPA data are available on the EPAs website. 
 
7 The data available to us are not sufficient to measure supplier withholding behavior by generators located 
outside of the CAISO.  Nor can we measure the control over generation supplies acquired by wholesale 
market aggregators or their bidding and supply behavior.  Yet, as we will demonstrate, net imports into 
California can have significant effects on market-clearing prices. These imports declined significantly in 
Summer 2000 compared to Summer 1999 and wholesale marketers were likely to have been active 
participants as buyers and sellers in the California markets.  It is possible that generators, or wholesale 
market aggregators, controlling supplies from generating units outside of California may also have the 
incentive and ability to increase wholesale market prices in California (and the rest of the WSCC).  
Accordingly, a complete and definitive picture of wholesale market behavior and performance in California 
this past summer, and the effects of strategic behavior by suppliers with market power, requires an analysis 
of demand and supply conditions in those portions of the WSCC that historically have provided the bulk of 
the net supplies to California.  Such an analysis should also take account the control over generation 
supplies accumulated by wholesale marketers operating in the WSCC.  The information necessary to 
perform this analysis is neither publicly available nor available to the CAISO.  This is the area where 
additional data collection and appropriate empirical analysis by responsible regulatory agencies can provide 
value-added to the extensive analysis of market behavior and performance of California suppliers that has 
been completed over the last two years. 
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A number of previous studies have examined wholesale electricity prices in 
California and found some evidence of market power, especially during high demand 
periods.   Most of this analysis relies on confidential data available only to the CAISO or 
to the California Power Exchange (PX).  In addition to extending this kind of analysis to 
the Summer of 2000, our paper provides three innovations.  First, it relies on data which 
are generally available to the public rather than on confidential data available only to the 
CAISO or PX and their respective market surveillance committees.  Second, previous 
analyses of wholesale market prices in California have not systematically taken into 
account the prices for NOx emissions permits which generating plants located in the Los 
Angeles area must hold to cover their emissions of NOx.  Third, we introduce a 
complementary analysis of unit level output behavior to determine whether capacity was 
strategically withheld. 
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2. Background 
 
 The California market institutions in place in the Summer of 2000 were 
introduced in April 1998 after four years of debate about electricity sector restructuring 
and the design and creation of complex new wholesale market institutions.  Under 
Californias electricity restructuring and deregulation program, wholesale market prices 
were intended to be  market-based.8  The non-profit CAISO was created to operate the 
transmission networks owned by the states Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) and the PX 
was created to operate day-ahead hourly auction markets for wholesale electrical energy.9  
The CAISO was also given the responsibility to operate hourly auction markets for 
reserves (ancillary services) and imbalance energy and to manage congestion.  All supply 
from generators selling into the CAISO control area and all demand by load-serving 
entities located in the CAISO control area must ultimately be physically scheduled with 
or dispatched by CAISO.  
 
 Energy to meet California loads comes from both in-state generators and out-of-
state generators.  The in-state generators consist of four nuclear power plants, hydro-
electric plants that are located primarily in Northern California, gas-fired steam and 
peaking turbines, and cogenerators and other generation sources that are Qualifying 
Facilities (QFs) under the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA).  
About half of in-state generating capacity consists of gas-fired steam and peaking units 
and these units are the marginal supply sources during most hours in the Summer when 
electricity demand in California is highest.  These units were sold by the three incumbent 
utilities in 1998 and 1999 to five independent power companies and these new merchant 
generators owned these units during the period we study.  It is fairly easy to measure the 
marginal costs of these units since their thermal efficiencies at different output levels are 
well known and spot market prices for natural gas are available from a variety of sources.  
No new generating capacity has entered the California market between the time these 
generating units were divested and the period we study; most of this gas-fired capacity 
dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
 During the Summer months, the marginal supply resource that clears supply and 
demand is typically a conventional steam or combustion turbine unit fueled by natural 
gas or oil.  Figure 1 depicts the marginal cost curves for this gas-fired generating capacity 
in CAISOs control area, assuming that the price of gas is either $2.50/Mcf  (as in 1999) 
or $6/Mcf (as in late Summer 2000). These marginal cost curves can be thought of as the 
top of the CAISO areas competitive generation supply curve during the Summer 
                                                           
8 Technically, wholesale prices have not been deregulated.  They are subject to regulation by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) pursuant to the Federal Power Act.  The Federal Power Act 
requires FERC to approve wholesale prices only if they are just and reasonable.  Traditionally, FERC 
fulfilled its obligations under the Federal Power Act by using various cost benchmarks to cap wholesale 
prices (Joskow, 1989).  During the 1990s FERC began to grant suppliers market-based pricing authority 
if they could demonstrate that they did not have market power (Joskow, 2000).  This is the basis for 
deregulation of wholesale market prices in California. 
 
9 The PX ceased functioning in January 2001(?).  During its existence, the PX also operated hour-ahead 
and monthly block forward markets, but they were of little quantitative or financial significance and will 
not be discussed further here. 
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months.  During Summer hours, a competitive market would clear somewhere along 
these supply curves.  Changes in natural gas prices shift the supply curve up or down and, 
other things equal, competitive market prices would move up or down along with the 
changes in gas prices.  Changes in demand move the equilibrium competitive price along 
this supply curve so that competitive prices increase directly with demand.  As we shall 
discuss, tradeable permits for NOx emissions increase and twist the marginal cost 
curve depending on the price of NOx credits and differences in emissions rates across 
generating units, so that the competitive price for electricity increases directly with NOx 
permit prices.  In addition, at high demand levels, the competitive supply curve is much 
steeper with a NOx permit trading system than without one.  This is the case because the 
generating units with the highest emissions rates produce as much as 50 times more NOx 
per unit of electricity output than those with the lowest emissions rates while the 
difference in marginal fuel costs between the most efficient and least efficient generating 
unit is only a factor of about two. 
 
 
Figure 1. Marginal Costs for Gas Units 
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 Until 1998, the roughly 18,000 MW of gas-fired capacity in the CAISOs control 
area was owned by the three vertically integrated IOUs. Under Californias restructuring 
program, these utilities were required to sell this capacity to independent companies or 
New Generation Owners (NGOs).  As noted above, most of this capacity was ultimately 
sold to five out-of-state companies with large national unregulated power plant 
businesses.  The nuclear and hydroelectric capacity, and the high-price contracts with 
QFs, were retained by Californias three IOUs.  This amounts to about half of the original 
in-state generating capacity originally owned by or contracted for by these utilities prior 
to restructuring.  The hydroelectric capacity retained by the IOUs has limited energy 
production capabilities over the course of the year dictated by reservoir storage capacity, 
water runoff, and water release constraints. 
 
 California has historically imported large quantities of electricity from 
neighboring states.  During the 1960s and 1970s long high voltage transmission lines 
were built from California to the Northwest and the Southwest to facilitate transfers of 
energy to and from California.   California typically imports electricity from the 
Southwest (primarily nuclear, coal and gas-fired capacity) year round and imports large 
amounts of electricity from the Northwest (primarily stored hydro) during the Spring and 
Summer months.  During the late Fall and Winter months California historically exported 
some electricity to the Northwest, primarily during off-peak hours.  The generating 
capacity in the Southwest and the Northwest available to sell electricity to California is 
primarily controlled by vertically integrated IOUs or Federal Power Marketing agencies.  
These entities in turn have legal or contractual obligations to supply their local native 
loads and can only sell any excess supplies to California.  One of Californias investor-
owned utilities (Southern California Edison) owns nuclear and coal capacity in the 
Southwest and has contractual entitlements to some hydroelectricity produced at Hoover 
Dam.  Though the nuclear and coal plants have been put up for sale at auction and 
winning bidders for some of this capacity have been chosen, this capacity continued to be 
controlled by Southern California Edison during the period we studied.   
 
 Electricity demand in California is highest during the Summer months and lowest 
in the Spring and Fall months.  It is highest during the day and lowest at night and on 
weekends.  The peak demand in the CAISO control area in 1999 was about 43,000 MW.  
Demand fell to less than 20,000 MW during some off-peak periods.  Californias 
restructuring program included a retail competition option which permitted all retail 
consumers to arrange for their power supplies with an unregulated retail electricity 
service provider (ESP) of their choice.  ESPs arrange for power supplies in the wholesale 
market and deliver it to consumers over one of the utilitys distribution networks.  The 
distribution and transmission charges are regulated separately based on cost by the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and FERC respectively.  Consumers who 
do not voluntarily choose an ESP continue to receive default service from one of the 
three IOUs as they always have.  About 90% of the retail demand continued to be 
supplied by the utilities during 2000. 
 
 It is particularly important to note that the short run elasticity of demand for 
electricity in California is close to zero and is almost completely unresponsive to swings 
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in hourly prices since few consumers have hourly recording meters or the 
communications and control equipment to interact directly with the wholesale market.  
Moreover, during the time period we study, while wholesale prices were effectively 
deregulated, retail prices for generation service continued to be regulated based on a pre-
determined retail price of roughly $60/MWh.  When this cap was set in 1996, it was 
expected that wholesale prices would be far below this figure (about $30/MWh) for 
several years and that the head room between the $60/MWh retail price and the 
expected lower wholesale price would allow the utilities to recover quickly the costs of 
nuclear plants and QF contracts whose total costs were thought to be higher than their 
competitive market values in the wholesale market (stranded costs).  As soon as these 
stranded costs were recovered retail prices for electric energy were then supposed to be 
deregulated and fall to reflect wholesale market conditions.  The year 2000 led to some 
surprises on this front. 
 
 Californias restructuring and competition rules required the IOUs to serve all of 
their default service demand from the PX and ISO spot energy markets.10  They were also 
required to bid all of their remaining generation supplies into the PX and ISO spot 
markets. Independent generation suppliers and non-utility demands were not required to 
deal through the PX or ISO markets, but could instead enter into bilateral contracts and 
self-supply ancillary services. Since the utilities retained responsibility for such a large 
fraction of the demand, most of the wholesale trade in electricity took place either in the 
PXs day-ahead market or in the ISOs real-time balancing market. 
 
 Generators can receive revenues from several sources.  They can sell energy to 
the PX and ISO.  They may also enter into forward contracts with entities other than the 
three California IOUs.  Finally, they can earn revenues by supplying ancillary services 
to the ISO.  These services are reserves that the ISO can call on to manage imbalances in 
supply and demand and to deal with congestion.  Generators selected to provide ancillary 
services effectively enter into an option contract with the ISO.  They are paid a market-
clearing price (day-ahead or hour-ahead) to hold capacity in reserve and available to the 
ISO.  They are then paid for any energy that the ISO calls them to provide, based either 
on the market clearing price for energy or their bid, whichever is higher.   
 
Our analysis of prices focuses on the hourly day-ahead unconstrained prices 
observed in the PX during the Summer of 2000.  We focus on the PX because it was the 
venue where the bulk of the energy was traded.  Moreover, there appears to have been 
reasonably efficient arbitrage between the PX market, the bilateral day-ahead market 
(Joskow, 2000), and the real-time market (Borenstein, Bushnell, Knittel and Wolfram, 
2000).11  We focus on unconstrained prices (that is, pre-congestion management) for 
                                                           
10 Some forward contracting was permitted by the Fall of 2000 and some limited forward transactions took 
place in a block forward market run by the PX during 2000 as well. 
 
11 Joskow and Kahn (2001b) examines whether our supply withholding behavior is affected by using real-
time prices rather than day-ahead prices using June as a test case.  We also examine a variety of other 
issues raised by Harvey and Hogan (2001a) in that paper.  These considerations do not affect our basic 
results. 
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simplicity, though there was relatively little significant transmission congestion during 
Summer of 2000.  We do take congestion into account in our analysis of supplier 
withholding.  It should be noted, however, that our analysis ignores the ancillary services 
revenues earned by these suppliers and, accordingly, does not cover all of the revenues 
they receive from the market.12 
 
 Table 1 displays the average hourly volume-weighted prices for each month from 
April 1998 through December 2000.  The fourth column of the table is a comparable set 
of forecast prices for year 2000 published by the California Energy Commission in 
March 2000.  The table indicates that PX prices were roughly in line with expectations 
during 1998 and 1999 and the first four months of 2000.  Beginning in May 2000 prices 
began to rise and then rose to unprecedented levels in June.  Prices moderated somewhat 
in July and then jumped significantly in August before moderating a bit again in 
September.  Prices throughout the Summer months of 2000 were four to five times higher 
than in 1998 and 1999 and the CECs projections for 2000.  While we have not yet 
analyzed the post-September prices, it should be clear that prices did not return to 
normal levels and exploded again in December.  There are a number of unusual events 
that affected Californias electricity markets after October that make this period difficult 
to analyze: an order of magnitude increase in gas prices during December, gas shortages, 
changes in market rules, a large quantity of plant outages, utility credit problems, and 
other factors. Our analysis focuses on PX market clearing prices during the May through 
September 2000 period.13 
 
 It should be noted that the prices in Table 1 do not reflect fully unregulated 
wholesale prices.  Until July there was a $750/MWh cap on prices.  This cap was reduced 
to $500/MWh during July and then to $250/MWh in early August.  The $500/MWh and 
then $250/MWh cap were binding during many hours in August and September.14  In 
addition, as previously noted, Table 1 does not include revenues from sales of ancillary 
services, which also increased very significantly after May 2000. 
 
 
                                                           
12 Joskow and Kahn (2001b) explore the effects of incorporating ancillary services revenues into the 
analysis.  
 
13 See Joskow (2001) for a discussion of the entire period. 
 
14 Technically, the cap was on prices in the ISOs real-time market.  However, since it would have been 
irrational to pay more than the real-time market price cap in the day-ahead market, this became the 
effective cap on day-ahead prices in the PX as well.  During emergency situations, it was widely known 
that the ISO would pay more than the price cap for supplies and this probably had the effect of creating 
more emergencies as generators stopped scheduling supplies day-ahead or hour-ahead in the hope of 
getting higher prices from the ISO through a last-minute out of market sale.  The analysis here ignores 
the price cap and simulates unconstrained competitive benchmark prices.  Since we are comparing these 
simulated prices to actual market prices which reflect the effects of price caps we are likely to 
underestimate the true potential price gap attributable to market power. 
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Table 1. California PX Day-Ahead Prices 
($/MWh, Weighted Averages 7 x 24) 
 
Month 1998 1999 2000 2000 (CEC)(*) 
January     - 21.6 31.8 27.7 
February     - 19.6 18.8 24.1 
March     - 24.0 29.3 23.3 
April 23.3 24.7 27.4 20.0 
May 12.5 24.7 50.4 18.5 
June 13.3 25.8 132.4 18.8 
July 35.6 31.5 115.3 28.0 
August 43.4 34.7 175.2 40.9 
September 37.0 35.2 119.6 45.3 
October 27.3 49.0 103.2 32.2 
November 26.5 38.3 179.4 31.6 
December 30.0 30.2 385.6 30.7 
Average 30.0 30.0 115.0 28.5 
 (*) California Energy Commission Forecasts, 3/13/00. 
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3.  Method for Estimating Competitive Benchmark Prices with Public Data 
 
In this section we estimate competitive wholesale market benchmark prices and 
compare these benchmark prices to the prices that were actually observed.  We simulate 
an energy market in which all demand clears in a single market, i.e., we do not attempt to 
simulate the relationship between day-ahead and real-time markets.  (We note again that 
generators earn additional revenues from supplying ancillary services to the ISO.  These 
revenues are especially important for covering the fixed costs of peaking units that supply 
energy infrequently but serve as operating and replacement reserves much more 
frequently.)  The more the observed price exceeds the competitive benchmark price, the 
more one can presume that either market power was being exercised or some other source 
of market imperfection has interfered with the competitive interplay of supply and 
demand.  The competitive price benchmark that we utilize is the short run marginal cost 
of supplying electricity from the last unit that clears the market in each hour.  Comparing 
realized prices with marginal supply costs in this way is a widely accepted method for 
measuring the presence of market power, and is especially useful for examining  prices in 
commodity markets with homogeneous products like spot electricity markets.15 We 
recognize that modest departures from ideal competitive conditions do not necessarily 
imply that there is sufficient market power to be of policy concern; many markets that are 
not subject to price controls are imperfectly competitive.  Moreover, any empirical 
analysis of pricing behavior is subject to some degree of uncertainty.   Finally, we 
recognize that prices may depart from observed marginal cost even in a perfectly 
competitive market to reflect real capacity constraints and opportunity costs associated 
with inter-temporal production limits on energy-limited generators such as hydroelectric 
plants.  However, this approach allows us to quantify how far realized market prices 
depart from competitive benchmark prices and provides a useful metric, along with our 
analysis of withholding behavior, that policymakers can utilize to come to a judgment 
about whether the gap between competitive benchmark prices and actual prices is so 
large that regulatory interventions are justified.  
 
This approach to measuring market power in wholesale electricity markets was 
pioneered by Wolfram (1999) in her study of the electricity market operating in England 
and Wales. The same approach has been applied previously in studies of the California 
market (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2000; Wolak, Nordhaus and Shapiro, 2000; and 
Hildebrandt, 2000). We will discuss these earlier studies of market power in Californias 
wholesale electricity markets further below, though we note here that these studies relied 
on confidential data to which we do not have access.  Our work extends this approach to 
incorporate a complementary analysis of supplier behavior. 
 
The only published estimates of the competitive benchmark wholesale energy 
prices for California have been made by researchers with access to confidential CAISO 
                                                           
15 Economists frequently use the Lerner Index to measure market power.  The Lerner Index is calculated 
by taking the difference between realized prices and marginal supply costs and dividing by the realized 
prices: L= (P-MC)/P.  In a perfectly competitive market the Lerner Index is zero and in a pure monopoly it 
is equal to one.  The more the Lerner Index differs from zero, the greater is measured market power.  See 
Carlton and Perloff (1999), pages 92, 264, and 269 and Tirole (1988), pages 66, 70, 80 219-220, and 222. 
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data. In particular, Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (hereafter BBW) and Wolak, 
Nordhaus and Shapiro (hereafter WNS) adopt a methodology that takes advantage of 
CAISO data to simulate the competitive wholesale market price for energy in every 
hour.16 Hildebrandt (2000) also makes such estimates, using a methodology described in 
CAISO (2000). We also refer to Hildebrandts approach, but because the method is 
described in less detail, we emphasize BBW in what follows. We describe BBWs 
procedure briefly and then discuss how approximations must be made when the 
confidential data they rely upon are not available. Because WNS use the same methods as 
BBW, but they are described in detail only in BBW, all of our discussion of WNS 
procedures refers to BBW.  
 
We begin by summarizing how BBW estimate the output and competitive 
benchmark price for the different types of resources that serve demand in California. 
BBW rely on CAISO settlements data for the hourly output of must-take generation, 
geothermal and hydro production.17 The sum of the output from these resources generally 
exceeds 20,000 MW. CAISO peak loads are typically in the range of 30,000 to 45,000 
MW. Imports and California in-state fossil generation make up the difference. Net 
imports are not used directly by BBW. Instead they adjust observed net imports to reflect 
competitive responses to price. SCEs share of Mohave, located in Western Arizona, is 
treated as an internal resource by the CAISO.  Consequently, we assume that BBW 
include its output in their measure of must-take generation.  Production from other out-
of-state plants owned by in-state utilities, in particular the Palo Verde nuclear plant and 
the Four Corners plant, apparently is classified as imports.    If observed market prices are 
above the competitive level, then observed imported quantities will be above the level 
that would be obtained under lower competitive prices. BBW rely upon adjustment bids 
to characterize the price responsiveness of imports.18  They then simulate a dispatch of 
the in-state fossil generation included within the CAISO grid against the remaining 
demand.  To take account of random forced outages, BBW use a Monte Carlo procedure, 
taking draws from the outage distribution based on public data.   
 
Our procedure differs from BBW because it must be adapted to the limitations of 
public data, and our goal of making relatively simple, but robust estimates. We describe 
each major element of our analytical approach below. 
 
                                                           
16 Sheffrin (2000), discussed below, also has an estimate of the competitive benchmark price, but there is 
no discussion of the procedure used to construct it. 
 
17 Must-take generation consists primarily of nuclear and Qualifying Facilities under PURPA. BBW argue 
that the behavior of geothermal and hydro owners is competitive during the period they examine and so 
they use the hourly settlements data on that behavior in their calculation. 
 
18 Adjustment bids are supply and demand curves representing offers by scheduling coordinators to 
increase or decrease output at potentially congested interfaces. BBW aggregate these bids over all 
interfaces on the boundary of the California ISO control area. This information is not publicly available. 
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Load Slices  
We are constrained to analyze months as homogeneous periods because we only 
have hydro data available on a monthly basis (see below). Within each month, we rely, 
for simplicity, on 100 load periods. Joskow and Kahn (2001a) relied on 10 load periods.  
(We have increased the number of load slices to cover 100 load periods in response to 
arguments that the 10 load periods approach missed the convexity in the supply 
function and underestimated competitive benchmark prices.)  We segment the hourly 
demand in each month into 100 load periods. Within each load period, we look at the 
mean load in the period and use the intersection of that demand with the supply curve for 
the month to estimate the mean price for that load point. We add 3% to each demand 
level reflecting the CAISOs demand for ancillary services capacity.19  
 
Hydro 
Public data on hydroelectric output is only available on a monthly basis. EIA 
Form 759 gives output at the unit level.  These data allow us to separate units that are 
dispatched by the CAISO from other California hydro units, but provide no information 
about how to allocate the energy from the relevant units to different time periods.  We 
have tried assigning this energy to periods within each month using different algorithms.  
These algorithms assign energy to higher demand periods up to a maximum subject to the 
constraint that every period receive some minimum amount of hydro energy. Our base 
case relies on an algorithm which limits the amount of hydro energy in each period to a 
minimum of 60 percent of the amount that would be assigned to each hour if hydro 
energy were spread evenly throughout the month and a maximum of 8,500 MW.  This is 
a conservative procedure that may tend to allocate less hydro energy to high demand 
periods than actually occurs, leading to higher estimates of competitive peak period 
prices for electricity. 
 
The 8,500 MW hydro maximum is used by the ISO as their estimate of hydro 
capacity available in their control area (CAISO, 2001, p.9). It represents approximately 
two thirds of the hydro capacity inside of the ISO.20  Because of long-term contracts and 
agreements, such as those between WAPA and many CA municipal utilities, not all 
hydro capacity is available to meet peak demand. The 8,500 MW figure is approximately 
the capacity that can be dispatched by SCE and PG&E and hence is likely to be price-
responsive. 
 
 
                                                           
19 In Joskow and Kahn (2001a) we followed Hildebrandt (2000) which includes a 10% adjustment for 
ancillary services, representing 3% for regulation and 7% for WSCC guidelines on reserves.  We have now 
become convinced by others, including Harvey and Hogan (2001a), that the 10% adjustment is too large.  
Accordingly, in this paper we use 3%, representing expected demand for regulation energy. BBW also add 
regulation demand to load, but use actual ISO regulation requirements, which sometimes included other 
requirements, rather than an expected target such as 3%.  Under its Rational Buyer protocol, the ISO 
sometimes substituted purchases of regulation for purchases of other reserves when the price of regulation 
was favorable. 
 
20 Based on EIA Form 860, we count just under 12,000 MW of hydro capacity inside of the ISO including 
all hydro and pump-storage capacity in California besides that owned by LADWP. 
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Outages and Availability 
Forced and planned outages are different phenomena. Planned outages for 
maintenance are typically scheduled in low demand periods. This has the effect of 
equalizing reserve margins across months, to the extent possible. This is a common 
procedure in the industry and in production simulation modeling. During the Summer 
period there should be no planned maintenance, and we do not include any allowance for 
it.  We use NERC GADS data (NERC, 2000) on historical average forced outage rates by 
unit type to adjust the marginal cost curve (i.e., shift the supply curve backwards) to 
reflect non-strategic forced outage rates. This procedure is sometimes referred to as 
de-rating the nominal capacity of units to a firm capacity level. The forced outage 
rates for the gas plants are in the 6% to 13% range.21 
 
Wind turbine generators present a special problem. The CAISO applies an 80% 
unavailability factor to account for the random availability of wind power. We adopt this 
conservative view and convert the 1,876 MW maximum capacity of wind turbine 
generators into 375 MW of firm capacity.22 
 
Our methods for reflecting forced outages differ from those of BBW. BBW use a 
Monte Carlo simulation of forced outages for in-state fossil generation. BBW argue that 
maintenance decisions for these units are strategic variables and, therefore, they make no 
estimate of such outages for in-state fossil generators. By relying on settlements data for 
must-take resources, BBW are reflecting both maintenance and forced outages for all of 
this capacity. In contrast, we apply the outage treatment for in-state fossil to must-take 
resources as well, since we do not have hourly outage information.  
 
Our derating procedure underestimates supply if actual outages were below the 
historical levels reflected in the outage data we utilized.23 Of course, one of the rationales 
for introducing competition into the electric power industry was that market incentives 
would lead competitive suppliers to increase availability, reduce forced outages, and 
increase effective capacity.  Although it is difficult to verify actual outages for many 
resources, plant-level monthly energy data are available from EIA Form 900. We found 
that both Diablo Canyon and San Onofre nuclear power plants (which remained in the 
hands of the incumbent utilities and were subject to complex regulatory transition 
arrangements) ran at full capacity over the Summer months. Accordingly, we place them 
in our supply curve at full capacity. 
 
 
 
                                                           
21 The GADS data define a number of different outage rates. We use the EFOR (equivalent forced outage 
rate). BBW appear to use the FOF (forced outage factor). The FOF for gas plants range between 3% and 
4%. 
 
22 See CAISO (2001), pp. 13-15. 
23 Both BBW and Hildebrandt use actual hourly output for all must-take resources. These data are not 
available publicly. Since must-take resources are likely to be operated in a price-taking manner, it is 
appropriate to use actual production in their case. Strategic generators should not be treated in this fashion. 
  15
Imports  
Our measure of imports differs slightly from BBW. As discussed above, we 
assume that BBW include production from SCEs share of Mohave in their measure of 
in-state must-take generation. We include Mohaves generation in imports because its 
output is included in the line flows that we aggregate to construct our measure of net 
imports.  
 
Otherwise we adopt the BBW philosophy with regard to adjusting imports. They 
argue that high observed prices in California draw in more imports than would occur 
under lower competitive prices, other things equal. BBW use confidential data on 
adjustment bids to characterize this elasticity. We have assumed an elasticity of 0.33.  
This elasticity is loosely based on BBWs claim that imports would be 5.3 percent lower 
(p. 30) and prices approximately 15.5 percent lower (p. 33) under marginal cost pricing.  
Given the imprecision of their elasticity estimates,24 an elasticity of 0.33 is well within 
the range of what they find. We then use data on observed net imports, and PX prices to 
impute net imports under marginal cost pricing.  In other words, for each period and for 
every price level c, we calculate the amount of infra-marginal net imports as follows: 
 
 ( ) * ( )px
px
cnetimp c netimp p
p
η
 
=   
 
 
 
where η  is the elasticity of net imports, ppx is the realized PX price, and netimp(ppx) is the 
realized level of net imports at the realized PX price.  Our benchmark price is then the c 
at which the sum of estimated net imports and infra-marginal in-state generation, 
including must-take generation, clears the market. 
 
We rely upon imports to clear the market when in-state fossil supply is exhausted. 
Because this will occasionally require more net imports than what was actually observed, 
our procedure will raise their price substantially when this is required. These prices will 
be higher than the ISO price caps in place during the Summer. We interpret these cases as 
corresponding to the ISOs purchase of Out of Market (OOM) energy. 
 
In-State Fossil Generation 
Natural gas costs for weekdays at the Southern California burnertip and at Malin 
were provided to us by Southern California Edison, from trade publications. We add 
transport costs to the Malin prices to bring the costs to the burnertip in Northern 
California. Because we are constrained to a monthly level of analysis, we use monthly 
averages of these prices. The monthly gas price values used are given in Section 4, where 
we present results.  
 
We rely upon the Henwood Energy Services Incorporated (HESI) commercially 
available database for the WSCC to characterize heat rates, and variable O&M costs for 
in-state fossil generators. The heat rate data are consistent with those found in Klein 
                                                           
24 BBWs estimate of 5.3 percent has a standard deviation of 8.1 percent.  
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(1998). There are many definitions of unit capacity, which result in quantitative 
differences that typically are small.25 Accordingly, we adopt for this analysis the 
capacities posted on the ISO website.26 
 
RECLAIM NOx RTC Prices 
One factor that can affect competitive market prices for electricity which neither 
BBW nor the CAISO addresses involves the impact of the air emissions regulatory 
framework in California. California has extremely stringent air quality regulations. One 
pollutant of particular concern is nitrogen oxide (NOx). As explained above, regulation of 
emissions in the Los Angeles area is controlled by the SCAQMD, which operates the 
RECLAIM Trading Credit (RTC) emissions permit trading program for NOx emissions 
from electric generating units and other stationary sources.  Under this program NOx 
emissions are regularly reported during pre-established cycle periods.  The owners of a 
source of NOx emissions must reconcile NOx RTC allowances with reported emissions 
within 60 days of the end of the reporting cycle.27   The RTC program resembles the SO2 
permit trading regime authorized under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.28  
 
We would expect competitive generation suppliers to include the prices of RTC 
NOx credits in their bids even if these credits had been previously acquired at much 
lower prices (or for free).  This is the case because these emissions credits could be sold 
to other affected sources at their market value and thus represent a legitimate competitive 
market opportunity cost.29  RTC allowances had been selling at very low prices ($1-
2/pound) through the early part of 2000.  Since most generation in the SCAQMD area 
emits 1 lb/MWh of NOx or less, emissions costs internalized into electricity prices would 
be $1-2/MWh at most during this period. Starting in Spring 2000, however, RTC prices 
began to increase substantially.30 By June they were nearly $10/pound. This would add 
$10/MWh to MCP most of the time, and much more when gas turbines with much higher 
emissions rates, e.g., some turbines emit in excess of 6 lb/MWh, are producing 
electricity.  NOx RTC prices continued to climb throughout the Summer, rising to around 
$35/pound by late August.  At these levels, NOx RTC requirements significantly affect 
                                                           
25 Harvey and Hogan (2001a) took issue with the definition used in Joskow and Kahn (2001a). Joskow and 
Kahn (2001b) use different sources. 
 
26 See http://www1.caiso.com/docs/2001/04/02/2001040211441714244.xls 
 
27 NOx RTC allowances have expiration dates that correspond to the end of each cycle period. 
 
28 The SO2 emissions trading program is described in detail by Ellerman et al (2000). 
 
29 Obviously, generators which acquired these RTC NOx credits at much lower prices will earn very 
significant profits as a consequence of the run-up in NOx credit prices and its impact on wholesale 
electricity prices.  Thus, the impact of changes in NOx credit prices on electricity prices in a competitive 
wholesale market is far larger than it would have been under traditional cost-of-service regulation where 
consumers would have captured any infra-marginal rents associated with changes in NOx credit prices. 
 
30 We have not analyzed why NOx RTC credit prices increased so much during the summer of 2000 or 
whether the observed price increases are consistent with competitive behavior in the RTC credit market.  A 
careful analysis of behavior and performance of the RTC credit market would also be a worthwhile 
undertaking. 
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price during all hours for which fossil plants in the SCAQMD clear the market, but 
especially during peak periods when gas turbines are on the margin.  Therefore, we 
decided to add the effects of NOx RTC prices to our estimates. 
 
For most units in SCAQMD that were formerly owned by SCE, we rely on 
estimates of NOx emissions rates provided to us by SCE based on publicly available data 
and regulatory filings. For other units, we rely on NOx emissions rates from the HESI 
databases.  
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4. Results 
 
Table 2 below presents our estimates of competitive benchmark prices for May 
through September 2000. We report a range of prices, reflecting alternative assumptions 
about NOx RTC prices.  Table 2 also displays the actual average day-ahead PX prices 
during these months of year 2000 for comparison purposes. The data on NOx RTC prices 
are difficult to interpret for a variety of reasons. There is general agreement that NOx 
RTC prices were increasing between May and September. Finding an appropriate price 
for each month requires that we interpret the data from SCAQMD carefully. We give a 
full discussion of the choices we have made in the Appendix. Table 2 indicates in bold 
the benchmark wholesale market price associated with our choice of the most appropriate 
NOx RTC price for each month.  
 
 
Table 2. Competitive Counterfactual at Different RTC Costs (2000) 
 
Competitive Benchmark Price ($/MWh) 
Assumed NOx Price 
Average Gas Price 
($/MMBtu) Month 
Average 
PX Price 
($/MWh) $0/lb $10/lb $20/lb $30/lb $35/lb North South 
May 47.23 55.11 58.56 61.79 64.66 64.63 3.77 4.11 
June 120.20 64.84 67.23 70.14 73.38 74.99 4.59 4.99 
July 105.72 58.62 60.91 63.25 65.60 66.72 4.35 4.97 
August 166.24 86.96 92.02 96.97 102.40 105.15 4.84 5.69 
September 114.87 74.08 78.34 83.07 86.88 88.96 5.88 6.64 
 
 
It is clear from Table 2 that there is a significant gap between the competitive 
benchmark prices that we estimate and actual market prices in June, July, August and 
September 2000.  We want to emphasize that this gap between competitive benchmark 
prices and actual market prices takes into account the effects of gas prices, load levels, 
import levels, and NOx credit prices; the market fundamentals that have often been 
identified as contributing to higher prices in Summer 2000 than in Summer 1999.  It is 
also interesting to note that if NOx credit prices had remained at 1999 levels, competitive 
benchmark prices would have been reduced significantly, especially in August.  We 
believe that the estimated price gap is large enough to provide compelling evidence that 
market power or other market imperfections lead to a significant increase in prices above 
competitive levels during Summer 2000.   
 
Our estimates of competitive benchmark prices are very similar to those obtained 
in other studies using similar techniques and confidential data to which we do not have 
access.  BBW does not include the cost of RTC allowances in their estimates. Given the 
very low level of RTC prices until the Spring of 2000, these costs would not significantly 
impact the estimates made in BBW, since these only extend through September 1999.  
Hildebrandts estimates of the May-September competitive prices are similar to our 
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estimates in the zero RTC price case. For May, June and July our estimates are within 
$1/MWh of his. For August and September our estimate is $4-8/MWh higher.  
 
Import Sensitivity 
One use of the framework that we have applied to develop competitive 
benchmark prices is to examine hypotheses about the effects of key variables on 
competitive market prices. Here we examine the effect on wholesale prices of reductions 
in net imports between 1999 and 2000. Many commentators have remarked on the 
significant decline in net imports between Summer 1999 and Summer 2000.  Table 3 
shows the mean difference in actual monthly net imports from year to year.  It also 
compares the estimated benchmark price before considering effects of RTC credit prices 
(i.e., based on the zero RTC credit price column in Table 2) with our estimate of what the 
competitive benchmark price would have been if the 1999 level of imports had occurred.  
It is clear that prices are higher in Summer 2000 as a result of lower net imports, but if 
NOx emissions were not an issue, the impact of reduced imports alone accounts for a 
relatively small fraction of the actual increase in wholesale prices from Summer 1999 to 
Summer 2000.  As NOx RTC prices rise toward the end of the Summer, the reduced level 
of imports becomes a much more important factor in explaining wholesale price 
increases.  This is the case because as imports fall, in-state generating units with 
relatively high emissions rates run more often to balance supply and demand. 
 
 
Table 3. Net Import Sensitivity 
  
  June July August September 
1999 actual average hourly net imports (MWh) 5,871 6,633 6,539 7,070 
2000 actual average hourly net imports (MWh) 4,262 3,621 3,162 4,386 
MCP with 1999 net imports ($) NOx $0/lb 60.33 47.10 58.08 64.89 
MCP with 2000 net imports ($)  64.84 58.62 86.96 74.08 
MCP with 1999 net imports ($) NOx $10/lb 62.22 48.47 62.18 67.30 
MCP with 2000 net imports ($)  67.23 60.91 92.02 78.34 
MCP with 1999 net imports ($) NOx $20/lb 65.08 49.56 65.02 69.17 
MCP with 2000 net imports ($)  70.14 63.25 96.97 83.07 
MCP with 1999 net imports ($) NOx $30/lb 68.05 50.46 68.19 70.75 
MCP with 2000 net imports ($)  73.38 65.60 102.40 86.88 
MCP with 1999 net imports ($) NOx $35/lb 68.52 50.95 68.18 71.35 
MCP with 2000 net imports ($)  74.99 66.72 105.15 88.96 
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5. Withholding and Unilateral Market Power: The Economic Logic 
 
The previous analyses shows that market fundamentals cannot fully account for 
the high levels of observed prices in the Summer of 2000.  Even after accounting for 
lower levels of imports and very high NOx RTC prices, we still observe a large deviation 
of wholesale market prices from the competitive benchmark price, i.e., marginal costs of 
supplying additional electricity at the associated market clearing quantities.  However, 
while we observe large price/marginal cost margins during the Summer of 2000 which 
we believe are inconsistent with competitive markets, our analysis so far does not 
measure behavior that is likely to be the cause of these high prices. It has been 
conjectured, for example, that the high observed prices simply reflect scarcity rents that 
arise when demand is high, capacity constraints are binding, and competitive market 
prices must rise to clear the market (CaPX, 2000).  In the next two sections we 
investigate the hypothesis that withholding behavior by generators in California is one 
cause of the large measured gap between prices and marginal costs.  It is clear from first 
principles that supply withholding could be the source of high prices. Whether this is, in 
fact, the case is an empirical question.  
 
We begin by presenting a simple example to demonstrate the unilateral profit 
maximization logic behind capacity withdrawal and show that rational capacity 
withholding does not require collusion among suppliers. We consider the unilateral case, 
i.e., only one portfolio player adopts this strategy and all other generators behave 
competitively and bid at prices equal to their marginal cost. We can characterize the 
profit effects of capacity withdrawal simply as the sum of two effects. These are (1) the 
increased profits on the capacity offered after withdrawal due to the ability to raise price, 
and (2) the lost profits of capacity withdrawn (see Wolfram, 1998). The profit changes 
must-take account of the cost reduction due to not producing on the withdrawn capacity. 
We can express these effects as follows: 
 
∆ Profit = 
∆ Price * Remaining Quantity - ∆ Capacity *  Competitive Price + ∆ Operating Cost 
 
This expression is derived formally in the Appendix. 
 
As is apparent from the formula, whether withdrawing capacity is in the self- 
interest of a portfolio generator will depend critically upon the slope of the supply curve.  
It must be steep enough to result in MCPs sufficiently high so that the increase in profit 
on generation still tendered to the market more than offsets the profits lost on the capacity 
withdrawn. We construct some examples based on our benchmark estimate of 
competitive supply conditions that prevailed in June 2000. These estimates come from 
our June simulations (with NOx effects). We examine one case, at higher loads, where a 
load increase or capacity withdrawal of 1,500 MW results in a price increase of about $36 
per MWh.  Our second case, at lower loads, produces only a $3 price increase for the 
same 1,500 MW withdrawal.   
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Table 4 displays the profitability effects of capacity withholding for the two 
examples.31  In both cases, we make three assumptions:  (1) the portfolio generator with 
3,000 MW of capacity produces only half that amount, (2) the competitive MCP is 
$60/MWh,32 and (3) the generators marginal cost is $55/MWh. In the first case, where 
capacity withdrawal raises price significantly, the revenue gain is large. In the second 
case, the impact of withholding capacity on price is relatively small because supply is 
much more elastic over the relevant range of output.  Withholding is unprofitable since 
the increase in price on the tendered generation does not offset the lost profits on 
generation withheld. The details of these results are shown in the following table. 
 
 
Table 4. Unilateral Market Power Examples 
 
Case Revenue Loss Revenue Gain Cost Savings ∆ Profit
∆ Case 1 
High Price Increase 90,000 54,000 78,750 42,750
∆ Case 2 
Low Price Increase   90,000 4,500 82,500 -3,000
 
 
These stylized examples are constructed to make it difficult to find unilateral 
market power.33 They rely on the assumption that only one supplier withholds capacity, 
while all of the other suppliers behave competitively.  In the California electricity market 
during the Summer of 2000, it appears that more than one portfolio player was 
implementing a withholding strategy. We illustrate this claim empirically in the next 
                                                           
31 This example differs slightly from a similar calculation in Joskow and Kahn (2001a). The changes reflect 
re-estimation of the supply curve. 
 
32 As Appendix B illustrates, the slopes of the supply curve used in the examples lie just above and below 
the reference price of $60/MWh. 
 
33 Harvey and Hogan (2001b) explore this example at some length. Their discussion seems to confuse the 
stylized example representing competitive conditions with observed behavior in the real market.  In the real 
market, the price changes associated with load changes were much higher than those used in the simple 
competitive case. This increases the incentive to withhold substantially. Moreover, we want to emphasize 
that the example was structured to make it difficult to find unilateral market power to be profitable since it 
assumes that all other suppliers are price takers and behave as a competitive fringe.  If we had made the 
more conventional assumption of non-cooperative oligopoly models (e.g., Cournot or Supply Function 
Equilibrium models) that multiple suppliers could act strategically, the incentive of a single supplier to 
withhold would be even greater.  Further, since organized wholesale electricity markets involve repeated 
interactions between suppliers in the context of good public information about supplier costs, demand, and 
market prices, one might expect to find more collusive outcomes by applying a repeated game framework 
rather than static non-cooperative oligopoly theory. The bottom line is that there are very good theoretical 
reasons to believe that suppliers have market power when demand is high and supply is relatively inelastic 
given the other characteristics of electricity (e.g., non-storability).  If there is a puzzle here, it is why prices 
were not even higher than those observed.  A partial answer is that, but for the price caps in effect, actual 
prices would in fact have been much higher than those we observe.  
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section.  If multiple suppliers are behaving strategically, the effects of withholding on 
wholesale market prices could be much larger than suggested by these simple examples.   
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6. Empirical Analysis of Withholding  
 
Now we turn to the analysis of physical supply and withholding behavior.  We 
use plant and unit level output data from EPA, the ISOs real-time dispatch, and the 
WSCC to examine the physical behavior of the price setting firms to determine whether 
there was really scarcity,  that is, that demand was so high that competitive prices 
above marginal cost were necessary to clear the market, or whether generators withheld 
supplies from the market when it would have been profitable for a generator without 
market power to supply more. 
 
We restrict our analysis to a set of high-priced hours when it should have been 
economical for virtually all of the fossil generators to supply, absent market power. In 
particular, we look at hours when the real-time price34 was greater than 17,000 Btu/kWh 
times the delivered gas price plus 1 lb NOx/MWh times the monthly RTC price. The heat 
rate threshold covers virtually all steam and most peaking units. The NOx emission rate 
covers almost all steam units. Units with higher costs should be reserved to provide 
ancillary services. Table 5 below shows the average price and number of hours per month 
that meet this criterion. 
 
 
Table 5. Monthly Cut-Off Prices and Number of High-Price Hours 
 
Monthly Cut-Off Averages 
($/MWh) 
Number of High-Price Hours 
  Month 
SP15 NP15 All Hours Hours without South  to North Congestion 
June 95 89 104 96
July 105 95 124 114 
August 132 118 271 241 
September 148 139 82 66 
 
 
We compare observed levels of production by units likely to be setting prices, 
with their maximum generating capacities during those hours.35  NP15 generation is 
analyzed separately from SP15.  There is a substantial output gap between observed 
and maximum possible levels of generation in both zones.  Three factors may explain this 
gap: (1) capacity may be covering the CAISOs ancillary services requirements, (2) 
capacity may be out of service due to forced outages, and (3) interzonal transmission 
constraints (South to North) may limit economic dispatch of SP15 plants.  Therefore, we 
test whether the gap can be explained by these three factors.  If the gap cannot be 
                                                           
34 We focus on the real-time price, as opposed to our first analysis (2001a) that used day-ahead prices. 
Harvey and Hogan (2001a) correctly observe that the real-time price is a better indicator for production 
data since it reflects all output decisions by suppliers. As we observed earlier, however, there is a close 
correlation between these prices. 
 
35 These calculations correct for the Daylight Savings Time issue identified in Harvey and Hogan (2001c). 
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explained, we conclude that it is indicative of generator withholding resulting either from 
high bids that do not clear the day-ahead or real-time energy markets or direct 
withholding of capacity from these markets. 
 
• The ancillary services tests have two elements: (1) we compare the zonal CAISO 
ancillary services requirement in the selected hours against the output gap, and (2) we 
consider whether the CAISO dispatched reserves during our sample hours.  If 
reserves were dispatched, they will appear as production in our data and would, 
therefore, not explain any output gap.  
 
• The forced outage test is necessarily limited in its applicability.  We apply three 
outage tests to the data to ascertain whether forced outages might explain output gaps. 
 
• The congestion test requires that we identify congestion during our sample hours.  
Production levels in hours without a constraint should not be affected by transmission 
issues. 
 
We rely on three data sources for this analysis. Each has hourly production data, 
but the sources differ by the units covered. EPAs Continuous Emissions Monitoring 
System (CEMS) database tracks hourly production and emissions of certain pollutants 
that are regulated under the Clean Air Act. CEMS data are available on the EPAs 
website. CEMS data do not include gas turbines and some small thermal units. Table 6 
below lists the largest units that are omitted from the CEMS database, their ownership, 
capacity and NOx emission rates.  About 1,300 MW of gas capacity is excluded from the 
EPA data.  We address units excluded from CEMS in two ways. For most peaking units, 
we rely on the ISO BEEP stack dispatch.36 The BEEP data record the energy dispatched 
from units in real time, but do not include any energy that may have been scheduled 
before real time.  Because we are using BEEP to characterize the output of GTs and GTs 
generally run fully loaded, when we observe output for a unit in a given hour in BEEP we 
assume that the unit operated at full load for that hour.  The third source gives data at the 
plant level, not the unit level. These data are from the WSCCs Extra High Voltage 
(EHV) database. The EHV data, which are available to all WSCC members, were 
provided to us by SCE. We rely on this data only for the Long Beach units. These are 
rather inefficient combined cycle units, with heat rates of approximately 10,500 
Btu/kWh, which could nonetheless be expected to produce energy during high-price 
hours. 
  
                                                           
36 BEEP is an acronym for Balancing Energy and Ex-Post Pricing. This software records the instructions 
given by the ISO to units that it dispatches in real time. BEEP stack dispatch data is available on the ISO 
website. 
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Table 6. Units Excluded from CEMS Database 
 
Unit Owner June Capacity (MW) NOx (lbs/MWh) 
Long Beach 8 Dynegy 276 1.2 
Long Beach 9 Dynegy 276 1.2 
Highgrove 1-4 (*) Thermo Ecotek 154 1.2-2.4 
Etiwanda GT Reliant 141 5.4 
Alamitos GT AES 134 6.5 
Huntington Beach GT AES 133 5.7 
Elwood GT Reliant 48 5.4 
Mandalay GT Reliant 132 5.7 
(*) While Highgrove reports emissions data as part of the EPA program, these plants did not 
operate in the relevant time period. 
NOx are calculated from publicly-available data.  
Analysis of June  
We begin by focusing in detail on the month of June. Our analysis attempts to 
discover if there is an unexplained gap between generators capacity and observed 
production.  An otherwise unexplained gap would tend to support our hypothesis that 
production was withheld by generators in an attempt to drive up price during these 
periods.  June is a particularly interesting month in light of criticisms made by Hogan and 
Harvey (2000a) and others regarding natural plant outages and reservoir effects.  
Generating units in California typically come back into service from their annual 
maintenance outages during May and early June and should be ready to operate reliably 
through the peak Summer months.  Accordingly, we would expect generating units to 
exhibit low forced outage rates during June even if they are run hard during that month.  
It is also widely accepted, we believe, that the subsequent run-up in natural gas prices, the 
large increase in demand, and the large increase in NOx credit prices were not anticipated 
in June 2000 and could not have been factored into competitive supplier behavior during 
that month.  Accordingly, a finding that there was significant withholding of generating 
capacity during June 2000 is especially strong evidence supporting the exercise of market 
power as its source.   
 
Logically, congestion on the transmission system could help to explain any output 
gaps we might identify.  We therefore have examined data on interzonal transmission 
levels and congestion to determine the extent of transmission congestion.  Since it 
appears that withholding was most likely in the SP15 zone, we have reviewed the 
possible impacts of South to North congestion on our findings. Table 5 shows that while 
interzonal transmission constraints do occur occasionally, they are typically limited to 
about ten percent of the hours with real-time prices greater than our threshold prices. In 
the interest of simplification, we have omitted such hours from further analysis. 
 
We begin by computing the aggregate output gap for all generators for June hours 
when the real-time price is above our threshold, which averages $95/MWh in SP15 or 
$89/MWh in NP15; there are 96 hours that meet this criterion and where there is no real-
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time South to North congestion.  In each of the 96 hours when the price is above these 
thresholds, we observe the hourly output of generators owned by Duke, Southern, AES, 
Dynegy and Reliant. We expect to find that production in these hours will be at 
maximum levels.  Next, we sum up the hourly output for each firm in NP15 and in SP15 
separately. We compare the June production of each generator over each of the 96 hours 
to our estimate of their capacity. We define the output gap for each firm to be the mean 
difference between total capacity and the observed output in each of the 96 uncongested 
high-priced hours.  It is important to note that the dispatch of these generators may be 
controlled by contractual arrangements with third parties other than the owners of the 
generating plants.  It has been widely reported that this is the case for the AES units, 
which operate under a tolling agreement with Williams, but we do not know whether or 
how much control has been ceded to marketers through contracts otherwise. Accordingly, 
we use the owners simply to identify the generating plants examined and any apparent 
withholding observed. 
 
Next, we want to see how much of the gap can be explained by the CAISOs 
reservation and use of capacity for Ancillary Services (we include Up Regulation, Spin, 
Non-Spin and Replacement Reserves).37  Public data on CAISO demands for Ancillary 
Services (AS) are available by zone. We compare the output gap by zone to AS capacity 
by zone for each hour. We then check the BEEP data to determine what fraction of 
reserves were dispatched.38. Table 7 below summarizes our results.  
 
 
                                                           
37 We exclude Down Regulation, because that does not require that capacity be held in reserve. 
 
38 The BEEP stack is the ISOs real-time supply curve.  It consists of both bids for imbalance energy and 
the energy portions of bids to provide ancillary services.  The BEEP data that we use to measure the output 
of GTs also indicate whether a unit was dispatched because an imbalance energy bid was called or because 
an energy bid associated with a specific ancillary service was called.  So, the BEEP data can be aggregated 
to calculate a measure of dispatched ancillary services. 
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Table 7. Mean Level of the Output Gap: June 2000 
 
    Mean Values (MWh) 
Zone Owner Output Capacity Gap Undispatched AS 
NP15 Duke 1,469 1,485 16   
  Mirant 2,063 2,629 565   
  NP15 Total 3,532 4,114 581 1,222 
   
SF Mirant 206 369 163   
  SF Total 206 369 163 24 
   
SP15 AES/Williams 2,735 3,967 1,232   
  Duke 675 717 42   
  Dynegy 1,492 2,834 1,342   
  Reliant 2,492 3,790 1,298   
  SP15 Total 7,394 11,308 3,913 1,326 
   
ZP26 Duke 990 1,021 31   
  ZP26 Total 990 1,021 31 31 
 
 
 
For SP15, the mean of the output gap is 3,913 MW compared to 1,326 MW for 
the mean of the undispatched AS demands in the zone. This leaves an average 
unexplained mean output gap of nearly 2,600 MW during the 96 hours, making the 
extremely conservative assumption that all of AS capacity requirements were covered by 
these units.  It is important to recognize that withholding 2,700 MW from the market 
during high demand conditions can have a very large effect on market prices. Referring 
back to Figure 1, it can be seen that a modest 1,000 MW increase in demand or reduction 
in supply can increase marginal supply costs by over 50% at relatively high demand 
levels. Based on these results, it looks as if a significant amount of capacity is being 
withdrawn on average during these high-price periods in SP15.  Accordingly, the gap 
between prices and marginal costs cannot be explained by scarcity. The results for NP15 
are different. Here the mean of the output gap is 581 MW, which is less than the mean 
undispatched AS capacity, 1,222 MW. Therefore, we cannot conclude definitely that 
there was capacity withholding in NP15.  
 
It is important to point out, however, that this assessment is quite crude and 
supplies an upper bound on AS capacity requirements that might explain the output gap.  
This is due to two factors:  (1) it neglects the possibility that hydro capacity or imports 
are supplying some of the AS demand, and (2) ramp rate restrictions might have made it 
physically impossible for the plants to supply the full AS requirement. While we have 
accounted for the effects of dispatching reserves on our analysis, we are unable to test the 
effects of alternative suppliers of AS services or those of ramp rate restrictions because of 
data limitations.  Obviously, to the extent that some of the AS demand is being satisfied 
by hydroelectric capacity and out-of-state resources, as is likely to be the case, the gap 
would be larger by an equivalent amount.   
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It is interesting to note that there is no evidence that Duke was withholding output 
in either SP15 or NP15.  Duke Energy, which appears to have been fully contracted in 
forward markets for 90% of its potential output, behaved much differently from Reliant, 
Dynegy, Mirant, and AES/Williams. Dukes production in SP15 was proportionally 
higher than that of these other firms. It reports much lower forced outage rates than what 
the other firms appear to claim. We believe that the outage rates and production levels 
reflect economic incentives. If generators are not contracted, their incentive is to withhold 
capacity and raise price.  Accordingly, Duke had no incentive to withhold output to drive 
up spot market prices, and this lack of incentives appears to be reflected in its behavior.39 
 
Extension to July, August and September 
Table 8 extends this analysis to the months of July, August and September for the 
SP15 zone. The pattern of results for NP15 is not materially different in these months 
than in June, so we drop further discussion of NP15 since nothing can be concluded on 
the basis of publicly available data.  
 
                                                           
39 Harvey and Hogan (2001c) argue that AES was the company with the highest level of forward sales 
and it experienced unusually high forced outage rates during 2000 (p.77). They are referring to the tolling 
agreement between AES and Williams.  This is not the type of contractual arrangement that mitigates 
incentives to withhold output to raise prices.  This tolling agreement  was essentially a contract to rent  
AES generation capacity to Williams, not a commitment by AES to supply specific production quantities 
at a fixed price.  Under this kind of agreement Williams, not AES, was free to determine how much energy 
was supplied by these units and could profit if market prices increased during the summer months. As such, 
Williams had an incentive to withhold, consistent with the settlement that they entered into with FERC 
involving alleged withholding in April and May 2000 (FERC, 2001). 
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Table 8. SP15 Mean Output Gaps 
 
  # of High   Mean Values (MWh) Dispatched Ancillary Services (MWh)
Month Price Hours Owner Output Capacity Gap AS Total Replacement Spin Non-Spin Total
June 96 AES/Williams 2,735 3,967 1,232        
   Duke 675 717 42        
   Dynegy 1,492 2,834 1,342        
   Reliant 2,492 3,790 1,298 1,756 330 30 69 430
    Total 7,394 11,308 3,913 1,326         
July 114 AES/Williams 2,757 3,967 1,210       
   Duke 635 717 82       
   Dynegy 1,811 2,765 954       
   Reliant 2,872 3,790 918 1,169 100 23 42 165
    Total 8,074 11,238 3,164 1,004         
August 241 AES/Williams 2,781 3,967 1,186       
   Duke 622 717 95       
   Dynegy 2,043 2,827 784       
   Reliant 3,076 3,790 714 1,532 183 101 79 363
    Total 8,521 11,301 2,779 1,168         
September (*) 66 AES/Williams 2,244 3,967 1,723       
   Duke 560 717 157       
   Dynegy 1,894 2,815 921       
   Reliant 3,072 3,790 718 1,135 130 38 39 207
    Total 7,770 11,289 3,519 928         
(*) Analysis for September includes days 1 through 20. The EHV data from which the Long Beach data are sourced end at September 20. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 shows somewhat smaller output gaps in July, August and September. Net 
of dispatched AS, the unexplained gap for July is about 2,200 MW. In August it drops to 
about 1,600 MW. In September it rises again to about 2,600 MW. We can express the 
unexplained gaps as some kind of outage rate, i.e., normalize them to total capacity. 
This calculation results in an average outage rate of between 15% (August) and 24% 
(June). Such rates are very high in comparison to historical average values for similar 
plants. The data used in our benchmark price analysis, for example, averages 7.5% and 
Dukes units appear to have achieved similarly low outage rates consistent with the 
historical experience for these generating units. 
 
Thus far our calculations make no attempt to assess whether the output gap can be 
explained by unscheduled outages.40 We examine this question next. Evaluating the 
                                                           
40 Whether an outage is scheduled does not mean that it is not the result of a strategic decision to 
withhold output to drive up prices.  The discussion of strategic behavior in electricity markets has 
distinguished between physical withholding and economic withholding.  Economically they are 
equivalent.  When a firm seeks to affect price by simply not making some capacity available to the market 
it is engaged in physical withholding.  When a firm decides instead to make the capacity available to the 
market at a supra-competitive price, knowing that some of the capacity offered will not be selected in the 
associated auction process, it is engaged in economic withholding.  A supplier that chooses not to make 
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effects of unscheduled (forced) outages is not completely straight-forward, because of the 
discretionary element in outages. Therefore we apply three different tests for forced 
outages. Test 1 measures the capacity of a generation portfolio by looking only at units 
that were producing any output in the hour in question. This is the strictest definition of a 
no outage condition. Test 2 measures the capacity of a generation portfolio by looking 
only at units that were producing any output in the day in question. Finally Test 3 
measures the capacity of a generation portfolio by looking only at units that were 
producing any output in the day in question or the day before. Another way of describing 
Test 3 is that an outage is real only if it occurred both the day before the day of our 
scarcity hours as well as the day of such an event. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
capacity available to the market will generally declare the capacity to be unavailable.  This decision may 
be made well in advance of actual operations (scheduled outage) or closer actual operations 
(unscheduled outage).  Precisely how a supplier chooses to withhold, and for what reasons, is not 
verifiable and under the CAISO rules there are no penalties against suppliers for being unavailable due to 
either scheduled or unscheduled outages.  Nevertheless, we believe that unscheduled outages are even more 
compelling indications of strategic behavior than are scheduled outages. 
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Table 9. SP15 Mean Output Gaps by Outage Test 
 
    Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
Month Owner Output Capacity Gap Output Capacity Gap Output Capacity Gap
  
Undispatched 
AS 
June AES/Williams 2,735 3,030 296 2,735 3,299 565 2,735 3,390 656   
  Duke 675 693 18 675 711 36 675 712 37   
  Dynegy 1,492 2,183 691 1,492 2,386 895 1,492 2,505 1,013   
  Reliant 2,492 3,258 766 2,492 3,511 1,019 2,492 3,592 1,100   
  Total 7,394 9,164 1,770 7,394 9,908 2,514 7,394 10,200 2,806 1,326
July AES/Williams 2,757 3,016 259 2,757 3,249 492 2,757 3,312 556   
  Duke 635 690 56 635 699 64 635 716 82   
  Dynegy 1,811 2,404 593 1,811 2,557 746 1,811 2,665 854   
  Reliant 2,872 3,272 400 2,872 3,395 523 2,872 3,518 646   
  Total 8,074 9,383 1,308 8,074 9,900 1,825 8,074 10,212 2,137 1,004
August AES/Williams 2,781 2,919 139 2,781 2,999 218 2,781 3,102 321   
  Duke 622 701 79 622 717 95 622 717 95   
  Dynegy 2,043 2,608 565 2,043 2,760 717 2,043 2,811 768   
  Reliant 3,076 3,410 334 3,076 3,565 489 3,076 3,633 557   
  Total 8,521 9,639 1,118 8,521 10,040 1,519 8,521 10,263 1,742 1,168
September (*) AES/Williams 2,244 2,425 181 2,244 2,522 278 2,244 2,640 396   
  Duke 560 688 129 560 699 139 560 703 143   
  Dynegy 1,894 2,479 585 1,894 2,619 725 1,894 2,649 755   
  Reliant 3,072 3,513 441 3,072 3,664 592 3,072 3,695 624   
  Total 7,770 9,106 1,336 7,770 9,504 1,734 7,770 9,687 1,917 928
(*) Analysis for September includes days 1 through 20. The EHV data from which the Long Beach data are sourced end at September 20. 
 
 
 
 
 Test 1 can be thought of as measuring either the withholding of a unit that could 
produce more in the given hour, or the occurrence of a partial outage in that hour.  
Table 9 shows that about 1,100 to 1,800 MW was not running during the high-price hours 
in June-September.  Undispatched AS could explain some of this amount. Tests 2 and 3 
employ different measures of capacity that might have run during the high-priced hours. 
The intuition here is that often units that might be experiencing some operating problems 
can be kept on line by operators who are strongly motivated to produce. Alternatively, if 
there is an economic incentive to withhold, then operators might turn them off. In such 
cases, conservative operation is also profit-maximizing.   
 
The data in Table 9 are unadjusted for the effect of price caps on the economics of 
plants in SCAQMD with high NOx emission rates.  Three of the gas turbines listed in 
Table 6 are in SCAQMD (Alamitos, Etiwanda and Huntington Beach). With emission 
rates greater than 4.5 lbs/MWh, these units would have RTC costs greater than 
$157/MWh in August and September when RTC prices were at $35/lb. The fuel costs of 
the gas turbines would be at or above $100/MWh during this period as well. When the 
price cap was lowered to $250/MWh on August 7, these units had marginal costs above 
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the cap. Therefore their capacity, about 400 MW total, should perhaps be excluded from 
the output gap estimates in Table 9. There may also be a related issue for units with NOx 
emission rates that are in the 2 lb/MWh range. At $35/lb, these units would have 
$70/MWh marginal costs for RTC credits. At the gas prices prevailing in August and 
September, some of these units might have marginal costs above the cut-off level for the 
hours that we examine. On the other hand, even these high cost units may have sold 
output under Out of Market arrangements with the ISO. We have not tested precisely 
the extent to which cost considerations could account for the output gap in August and 
September. These issues do not arise in June and July when RTC prices were lower.41 
 
We recognize that this analysis of capacity withholding is very rough and 
necessarily plagued by data imperfections. Moreover, the analysis does not examine 
behavior of generators outside of California, and does not account for aggregation and 
contractual arrangements by and with wholesale marketers.  A more complete analysis is 
not possible without access to confidential supplier data.   
 
                                                           
41 Other  profitability issues were raised by Harvey and Hogan (2001a), specifically in the context of 
June. Cardell (2001) raises such issues for later periods in the California market, when gas prices were 
substantially higher than during the summer period that we examine. We showed in Joskow and Kahn 
(2001b) that these issues were minimal in June. Harvey and Hogan (2001c) revisits them again arguing 
generally that all units which ran, or should have run, must be profitable ex post. This argument ignores 
the market uncertainties identified by these same authors. No bidder in any market characterized by 
uncertainty ex ante can be guaranteed profitability ex post.  Harvey and Hogan (2001c) also raise specific 
issues about how profits should be estimated which are unsupported by any empirical analysis. 
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7.    Conclusions  
 
It is clear that increases in gas prices, increased demand, reduced availability of 
power imports, and higher prices for emissions permits contributed to significantly higher 
wholesale market prices in California during 2000, compared to the previous two years.  
However, based on our analysis of available data, we conclude that wholesale electricity 
prices in California far exceeded competitive levels during June, July, August, and 
September of 2000. The high wholesale electricity prices observed in Summer 2000 
cannot be fully explained as the natural outcome of market fundamentals in a 
competitive market since there is a very significant gap between actual market prices and 
competitive benchmark prices that take account of these market fundamentals.  
Moreover, there is considerable empirical evidence to support a presumption that the high 
prices experienced in the Summer of 2000 reflect the withholding of supplies from the 
market by suppliers (generators or marketers).  We base these conclusions on results of 
the two analyses described herein: 
 
• Competitive Benchmark Price Analysis:  Observed prices in California in Summer 
2000 were greater than benchmark competitive price levels. These differences are not 
fully explained by higher loads, reduced levels of imports, high gas prices or by high 
prices for NOx RTCs. 
 
• Capacity Withholding Analysis:  The information that we have available to us 
suggests that withholding of capacity in SP15 to drive up price occurred during 
Summer 2000.  We find a substantial gap between maximum possible levels of 
generation and observed levels in those hours identified aseconomical for all in-state 
generation.  This gap cannot be explained by the CAISOs requirements for ancillary 
services or by reasonable estimates of forced outages.  While our analysis of 
withholding is necessarily limited by the data available to us, there is sufficient 
empirical evidence to suggest that the high observed prices reflect suppliers 
exercising market power. 
 
These empirical findings are further reinforced by the fact that the attributes of 
this electricity market make it likely theoretically that individual suppliers are likely to 
find it profitable unilaterally to withhold output compared to price takers in order to raise 
market prices.  In addition we found that Duke, which appears to have entered into 
forward contracts that eliminated or substantially reduced its incentives to withhold 
output, did not exhibit any withholding behavior during Summer 2000.  Just as the other 
suppliers acted on their unilateral incentives and withheld output, Duke acted on its 
unilateral incentives and did not withhold output.  Thus, the empirical evidence is 
consistent with general theoretical expectations. 
 
We close with some general thoughts about the use of economic analysis to 
identify and measure market power in electricity markets.  Long before the new 
competitive wholesale electricity markets began operating in California, it was widely 
recognized that supplier market power could be a problem in deregulated electricity 
markets in general (Joskow and Schmalensee; Joskow, 1997) and in California in 
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particular (Borenstein and Bushnell). Several different studies, using different data and 
different empirical techniques have analyzed pricing behavior in California during 
Summer 2000.  They have all come to very similar conclusions.  The evidence that there 
was a significant market power effect reflected in wholesale market prices in California 
during Summer 2000 is overwhelming.  Indeed, no comprehensive studies exist that 
come to a different conclusion.42  
 
If supplier market power is a potential problem then we must find good methods 
to diagnose its presence, and where the social costs of market power are significant, adopt 
mitigation mechanisms.  Simply ignoring market power problems at this stage of the 
development of competitive electricity markets is not a realistic option.  As with any 
other area of empirical microeconomic analysis, our ability to diagnose and measure 
market power is necessarily subject to some uncertainty, even using the best analytical 
tools available.  That there is measurement uncertainty, that data are not perfect, and that 
the analyst cannot observe all reasons for supplier behavior or peer into the heads and 
hearts of buyers and sellers is par for the course for empirical economic analysis. These 
facts cannot logically provide a rationale for ignoring the best work available.  Progress is 
made in improving the reliability of empirical economic analysis by ongoing efforts by 
analysts to replicate results, use different methods or better data to achieve similar 
goals in this case identifying and measuring market power.  Economic research that 
simply points to uncertainties and imperfections in data or analytical techniques 
employed by others, raises questions, without providing alternative estimates of the 
questions on the table using improved techniques or data, may provide some help to 
evaluate market behavior both positively and normatively with greater precision.  
However, such research would be more valuable if it followed up the questions it raises 
about work done by others with serious analysis that provides answers to the problem of 
interest.  To the extent that the intent of raising questions research is to make the case 
that there are too many uncertainties to say anything about market power we 
respectfully submit (a) that this is not a sound reading of the empirical literature on 
market power in electricity markets, and (b) that this kind of research can be easily 
misapplied by those with strong private interests in convincing policy makers to ignore 
market power problems. 
 
The measurement of market power is also logically separable from the questions 
of whether and what policymakers should do about it when it is found.  The problem that 
we have focused on here and elsewhere is to develop and apply techniques to measure the 
presences and the magnitude of market power and to understand better the conditions 
where it is most likely to arise.  We recognize that many markets are imperfectly 
competitive and that it would be fruitless, and probably counterproductive, for 
policymakers to try to achieve perfectly competitive markets.  However, the 
measurement techniques and applications presented here and elsewhere can be of value to 
policymakers to determine whether market power problems are sufficiently severe to 
require some policy response, and if they are, provide some modest guidance to choose 
among potential structural and behavioral mitigation measures. 
                                                           
42 Harvey and Hogans papers raise questions and identify uncertainties but do not put them together to 
come up with alternative estimates.  
  35
8. References 
 
Borenstein, S. and J. Bushnell, An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power 
in Californias Electricity Industry, POWER Working Paper PWP-044r, December 
1998, at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/PDFDown.html. 
 
Borenstein, S., J. Bushnell and F. Wolak, Diagnosing Market Power in Californias 
deregulated Wholesale Electricity Market, University of California Energy Institute 
Working Paper PWP-064, August 2000, at 
http://www.path.berkeley.edu/ucei/PDFDown.html. 
 
Borenstein, S., J. Bushnell, C. Knittel and C. Wolfram, Price Convergence in 
Californias Deregulated Wholesale Electricity Market, Proceedings of the University of 
California Energy Institute Conference, March 2000. 
 
California Energy Commission (CEC), Market Clearing Prices Under Alternative 
Resource Scenarios, 2000-2010, Staff Report, March 2000. 
 
California Independent System Operator Department of Market Analysis, California 
Energy Market Issues and Performance: May-June, 2000, August 10, 2000. 
 
California Independent System Operator, CAISO 2001 Summer Assessment, March 
22, 2001. 
 
California Power Exchange Corporation Compliance Unit (CaPX), Price Movements in 
California Electricity Markets: Analysis of Price Activity May-July 2000, September 29, 
2000. 
 
Capacity Sale and Tolling Agreement by and among AES Alamitos, L.L.C., AES 
Huntington Beach, L.L.C., AES Redondo Beach, L.L.C., and Williams Energy Services 
Company, FERC Docket No. ER98-2184, -2185 and 2186, July 15, 1999. 
 
Cardell, J., Testimony on behalf of Powerex, FERC Docket No. EL00-95-045, 2001. 
 
Carlton, D. and J. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, Third Edition, Addison 
Wesley Longman, 1999. 
  
Ellerman, D., P. Joskow, and R. Schmalensee, J. Montero and E. Bailey. Markets for 
Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program. Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, (FERC) Staff Report to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission on the Causes of Wholesale Electricity Pricing Abnormalities in 
the Midwest During June 1998, September 22, 1998. 
 
  36
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,  (FERC Staff Report) Staff Report to the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on Western Markets and the Causes of the 
Summer 2000 Price Abnormalities, November 1, 2000. 
 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,  Docket No. IN01-3-001, Order Approving 
Stipulation and Consent Agreement 95 FERC ¶61,167, April 30, 2001. 
 
Henwood Energy Services Incorporated (HESI), Database for the Western Systems 
Coordinating Council, 2000. 
 
Hildebrandt, E., Declaration of Eric Hildebrandt, FERC Docket Nos. EL00-95-000 and 
EL00-98-000, October 2000. 
 
Harvey, S. and W. Hogan (2001a), On the Exercise of Market Power Through Strategic 
Withholding in California, April 24, 2001. 
 
Harvey, S. and W. Hogan (2001b), Further Analysis of the Exercise of Market Power in 
the California Electricity Market, November 21, 2001. 
 
Harvey, S. and W. Hogan (2001c), Identifying the Exercise of Market Power in 
California, December 28, 2001. 
 
Joskow, P.,  Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform and Structural Change in the 
Electric Power Industry, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 
1989. 
 
Joskow, P., Restructuring Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity 
Sector, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(3), Summer 1997, pp. 119-138. 
 
Joskow, P., “Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electric Power Sector, in 
Deregulation of Network Industries: The Next Steps (S. Peltzman and Clifford Winston, 
eds.), Brookings Press, 2000. 
 
Joskow, P., Californias Electricity Crisis, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 17(3), 
Autumn 2001, pp. 365-388. 
 
Joskow, P. and E. Kahn (2001a), A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in 
Californias Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000, NBER Working Paper 
8157, March 2001, at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8157. 
 
Joskow, P. and E. Kahn (2001b), Identifying the Exercise of Market Power: Refining 
the Estimates, July 5, 2001, at http://econ.www.mit.edu/faculty/pjoskow/papers.htm. 
 
Joskow, P. and R. Schmalensee, Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electric Utility 
Deregulation, MIT Press, 1983. 
 
  37
Kahn, M. and L. Lynch, Californias Electricity Options and Challenges: Report to 
Governor Gray Davis, August 2, 2000. 
 
Klein, J., The Use of Heat Rates in Production Cost Modeling and Market Modeling, 
1998, at http://www.energy.ca.gov/papers/98-04-07_HEATRATE.PDF.
 
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Generating Availability Data 
System (GADS), Generating Unit Statistical Brochure 1995-1999, October 2000. 
 
Overduin, C., Test Report Water Injection and Opacity Tests at Alamitos Generating 
Station Unit 7, Southern California Edison Company Power Systems Engineering and 
Construction, 1994. 
 
Sheffrin, A., Options for System Market Power Mitigation, presentation to ISO Board 
Meeting, October 4, 2000. 
 
Tirole, J., The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988. 
 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Report of the U.S. Department of Energys Power 
Outage Study Team, March 2000. 
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Analyzing Electric Power Generation 
under the CAAA, Appendix 5: Pollution Control Performance and Costs, March 1998. 
 
Wolfram, C., Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market, 
American Economic Review, 89(4), pp. 805-826, 1999. 
 
Wolfram, C., Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids 
to Supply Electricity in England and Wales, RAND Journal of Economics, 29(4), pp. 
703-725, 1998. 
 
Wolak, F., R. Nordhaus and C. Shapiro, An Analysis of the June 2000 Price Spikes in 
the California ISOs Energy and Ancillary Services Markets, September 2000.  
  38
9. Appendices 
These Appendices present data underlying our analysis and/or illustrating our methods. 
 
A. Net Import Adjustment  
 The following table shows actual PX prices, estimated marginal costs using our methods 
($35 RTC price in this case), actual net imports, and estimated competitive net imports 
for the top 15 load percentiles in August 2000.  Our estimates of  competitive net imports 
are below observed net imports when our estimates of marginal costs are below observed 
PX prices. At the 97th percentile, net imports above those observed are required to clear 
the market. We use our elasticity relationship to find the price of imports required to 
induce the capacity needed to clear the market. That price is above the observed PX price 
and represents the kind of Out of Market (OOM) transaction that the ISO entered into 
under such conditions. 
 
Table A1. Sample Net Import Calculation for August 2000 
 
Load PX Price MC Actual NI Estimated NI 
Percentile [1] [2] [3] [4] 
85 232.13 99.33 3675 2769 
86 258.92 93.89 4427 3157 
87 326.22 102.54 4087 2779 
88 234.91 102.14 4345 3292 
89 307.11 102.54 4301 2984 
90 266.63 112.70 3889 2919 
91 314.34 127.53 3682 2726 
92 342.45 117.34 4823 3375 
93 337.72 152.93 4795 3682 
94 356.54 306.80 4786 4552 
95 374.26 315.50 4165 3935 
96 321.31 306.80 4518 4449 
97 373.34 463.72 4008 4308 
98 392.13 682.44 3929 4725 
99 392.55 1162.45 3648 5238 
  
 
B.  Unilateral Market Power  
This exercise explores the profitability of a generator withholding capacity relative to a 
competitive baseline in which price is set by industry marginal cost and all generation 
with marginal cost below the market-clearing price is dispatched.  We assume that all 
other generators produce at competitive levels and demand is completely inelastic.  
Under these assumptions, the effect of withholding on price is the same as a leftward shift 
of the industry supply curve by the amount of withholding. 
 
Suppose that all of a generators capacity qc is economic at a hypothetical competitive 
market-clearing price pc.  If it bid all of the capacity at below the market-clearing price, it 
would earn profits 
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where c(qc) represents its total cost of producing qc. 
 
Now, suppose that the same generator can raise the market-clearing price by withholding 
and producing ql<qc.  In this case, its profits would be 
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where 
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and ∆q is the extent of the generators withholding. 
 
The change in the generators profits due to withholding is then 
 
( ))()()( lclclc qcqcqqq
pqqp −+∆⋅
∆
∆
+−=∆Π  (1) 
 
The first term represents the revenue loss from producing at a lower level of output, the 
second term represents increased per unit revenue on remaining output, and the final term 
represents the cost savings from producing less.  The profits from withholding are the 
sum of these three components. 
 
If the generators marginal costs at qc and ql are MC(qc )and MC(ql) and we assume that 
marginal cost is linear between qc and ql, then 
 
( ) )()(5.0)(5.0)()( lccllc qqqMCqMCqcqc −⋅⋅+⋅=−  
 
Based on assumptions about the generators marginal costs at different output levels and 
the slope of the industry supply curve, i.e. the extent to which prices rise as inframarginal 
capacity is withheld, we can calculate the gains from withholding a specific quantity of 
capacity.  Table 4 shows a few numerical examples. The following table shows how to 
estimate the slope of the supply curve for June. The next table employs these slopes to 
estimate hypothetical profits from unilateral withholding. 
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Table B1. Calculation of the Supply Curve Slope for June 2000 
 
Load MCP Load Load and Reserves dp/dqenergy and reserves 
Percentile [1] [2] [3] [4] 
5 42.44 20,778 21,402 -- 
15 44.47 22,504 23,179 0.001140 
25 46.29 24,234 24,961 0.001023 
35 51.47 26,704 27,505 0.002034 
45 54.81 28,618 29,477 0.001695 
55 50.04 30,716 31,638 -0.002207 
65 52.23 32,680 33,661 0.001083 
75 53.69 34,655 35,694 0.000720 
85 58.83 37,036 38,147 0.002095 
95 151.00 40,735 41,957 0.024187 
[1] Estimated industry MC (NOx=$10/lb) 
[2] Load    
[3] Load and reserves=1.03*[2] 
[4] ([1]-[1]previous load decile)/([3]-[3]previous load decile) 
 
 
The last table gives details of the calculation in Table 4. 
 
Table B2. Calculation Details for Table 4  
 
pc qc ql MC(qc) MC(ql) dp/dq Revenue Loss Revenue Gain Cost Savings ∆ Profit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
60 3,000 1,500 55 50 0.024 90,000 54,000 78,750 42,750 
60 3,000 1,500 55 55 0.002 90,000 4,500 82,500 -3,000 
[7]= [1]*([2]-[3])               
[8]= [6]*([2]-[3])*[3]        
[9]= (0.5*[5]+0.5*[4])*([2]-[3])       
[10]= [8]+[9]-[7]               
 
 
 
C.  RTC NOx Credit Prices 
A unique characteristic of the RTC program is that while allowances periodically expire, 
the settlement procedures in the program give NOx emitters up to two months following 
the close of the cycle period to reconcile RTC allowances with actual emissions.  There is 
an active market in expired allowances during those two months.  It is improper, 
however, to correlate current prices for electric power with price movements in expired 
allowances.  Competitive prices will reflect the marginal costs of current inputs to current 
generation; competitive prices do not recoup unanticipated increases in sunk costs from 
past periods.   We have therefore examined the prices of RTC NOX credits over the study 
period in two groups:  prices for June are represented by June prices for RTCs expiring 
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on June 30, 2000, and prices for the post-June period are represented by 
contemporaneous prices for RTCs expiring on December 31, 2000.   
 
The main data issue for the SCAQMDs list of transactions at more that $4.00 is that the 
date given for an observation is the registration recording date (RRD) not the date the 
transaction was executed or received by SCAQMD.  We believe that the lag between the 
RRD and the deal date is about 1.5 weeks.  It looks like almost all of the RRDs are 
either Tuesdays or Fridays plus there is a memo in the materials discussing the receipt of 
a transaction at $30 on the 27th of July.  The RRD for this transaction is the 4th of 
August.   
 
With that caveat, we reviewed transactions over time for RTCs both for the period ending 
6/30/00 and for that ending 12/31/00.  The graphs of these transactions by estimated date 
are shown below. On the basis of these data, we choose $10/lb as the June RTC price, 
$20/lb as the July price and $35/lb as the August and September prices.  
 
 
 
Figure C1. NOx RTC Transactions Expiring on June 30, 2000
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Figure C2. NOx RTC Transactions Expiring on December 31, 2000 
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